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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

MONTHLY PROJECT STATUS REPORT

FOR MONTH OF

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SECURITY INFORMATION

1. CRYPTONYM BGC CONVOY	2. DIVISION OR BRANCH SE/PC/2	3. COUNTRY(S) Bulgaria	4. ESTIMATED COMPLETION PERCENT DATE
5. PLAN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> POLITICAL	<input type="checkbox"/> ECONOMIC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PARAMILITARY	<input type="checkbox"/> INTELLIGENCE REPORT
6. FINANCIAL MECHANISM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DIRECT	<input type="checkbox"/> SUBSIDY	<input type="checkbox"/> PROPRIETARY	<input type="checkbox"/> PURCHASE OF SERVICES
7. PHASE <input type="checkbox"/> PLANNING	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONAL	<input type="checkbox"/> LIQUIDATING	<input type="checkbox"/> TERMINATED
8. FUNDING			
FY ALLOTMENTS TOTAL TO DATE	OBLIGATIONS CURRENT MONTH	FY OBLIGATIONS CUMUL. TO DATE	UNOBLIGATED BALANCE
<input type="checkbox"/> J	<input type="checkbox"/> J	<input type="checkbox"/> J	<input type="checkbox"/> J
9. NAME OF CASE OFFICER <i>J</i>	ROOM NO. 1106J	EXTENSION 2656	SIGNATURE
10. FACTS, EVALUATION AND COMMENT: (Use additional plain sheet if necessary)			

A. Mission

See Sections II and III, Part II, of the "Bulgarian Country Plan" for a discussion of the cold war mission and tasks.

DOCUMENT NO.

006

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS SC

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HP-70-2

DATE 14/1/79

REVIEWER: *O1989* C J

B. Accomplishments

(1) Paramilitary

a. Bulgarian Guard Company - Routine training of the members is being continued under the direction of the American C/O and an executive officer recently loaned to the project for three months. Plans for further training of selected groups from the Guard Company at covert training sites have been abandoned. It has now been determined that Guard Companies will serve for the present as a holding mechanism pending establishment of a program under the Kersten amendment.

b. Covert Agent Training - The number of agents in training in Germany for spring operations has been reduced to eight, and to two in Greece. Since none of these trainees developed into high-calibre material, plans for spring operations are being revised downward to tasks commensurate with their ability.

c. Dimitrov Test Operations - Because of activities of Georgi Dimitrov in Europe during a recent visit which seriously jeopardized the security of the proposed test operation, planning has been indefinitely suspended until the extent of damage can be ascertained. Dimitrov was informed of the suspension in Paris on 12 March, sailed for the United States on 13 March, and has as yet made no attempt to contact the cut-out who ostensibly was sponsoring the operation.

(2) Political

a. Emigre Politics - The plan to broaden the Bulgarian National Committee and methods of implementing it are under consideration. Comments of BGC CONVOY are being prepared for submission thru PY/PW to interested agencies.

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b. Psychological Warfare

1. Radio Gorianin - Broadcasts continued on a daily basis.

<u>Previous Broadcasts</u>	<u>Current Month</u>	<u>Total Number</u>
273	31	304

Evidence recently received indicating that the chief script writer and announcer may be a Bulgarian agent was sufficiently strong that Athens has been directed to (a) remove him and (b) lay on an exhaustive interrogation. If it is determined that this man is an agent, a complete revision of the operation of Gorianin will probably be necessary.

2. Leaflet Drops - No drops have been made during the present month, but material for a future supply drop is available in Athens.

<u>Previous Drops</u>	<u>Current Month</u>	<u>Total Number</u>
2,000,000 leaflets	0	2,000,000

3. Economic - No activity.

4. Support - Arrangements have been made with a competent consultant who has excellent connections in Bulgarian-American circles to make various trips to contact possibilities for employment as translators and interpreters. The need for competent Bulgarian speakers in both psychological warfare and training activities continues to be critical.

C. Reaction

No reaction to BGCONVOY operations in Bulgaria, limited at present to psychological warfare, has been noted.

D. Conclusions

(1) Favorable Conditions Exploited:

a. Closer liaison between the SE Division and IOD, the Department of State and the National Committee for Free Europe offer for the first time an opportunity for BGCONVOY to be informed of the overall official financial support Georgi M. Dimitrov will receive. Dimitrov, a clever Balkan politician, has been able in the past to play off one group against another, thus frustrating attempts of BGCONVOY to succeed in implementing that phase of the project providing for testing Dimitrov's claimed resistance assets within Bulgaria. Reorganization of the Bulgarian National Committee to curb the Dimitrov one-man rule and stricter control of the disbursement of funds will increase Dimitrov's dependence on his ability to produce concrete results to secure financial remuneration commensurate with his past receipts.

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-3-

b. Completion of the training course in Germany and the advent of spring has afforded the opportunity to initiate plans for small-scale spring infiltration missions utilizing the small agent pool now available.

c. The expanding facilities of the training division in Germany have made possible the despatching of an assessment team to Athens and Istanbul to test selected Bulgarian refugees for possible agent material.

(2) Problems Encountered

a. The indefinite suspension of the proposed Dimitrov operation has probably precluded the possibility of mounting any exploratory infiltration using Dimitrov-selected agents during at least the next six months.

b. The possibility that a Bulgarian Intelligence Service agent may have penetrated the staff of Gorianin may cause drastic revision of planning for maximum utilization of that psychological warfare asset.

(3) Lessons Learned

a. The possibility of successfully launching an operation to test the assets of Georgi M. Dimitrov will depend on coordinated control of his utilization by U. S. Government groups.

b. Greater security precautions must be arranged in the utilization of recently-arrived Bulgarian refugees in the field.

(4) Courses of Action to be Taken

a. Increasing emphasis will be placed on securing Bulgarian-Americans for field service, thus cutting down the number of refugees and other Bulgarian-speaking aliens to be used in the field, except as infiltration agents.

b. A thorough examination of all aspects of the abortive Dimitrov operation, including detailed reports requested from field station, will be made. The final result will prove of great benefit in improving the chances of being able at a later date to test Dimitrov.

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